Anti-Jewish sentiment in the United States and Europe has varied substantially over time and across space. A 1964 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (see Selznick and Steinberg 1969) , for instance, reported that 48 percent of Americans believed Jews had irritating faults and were more willing than others to use "shady" practices to get what they want, while a similar 1992 survey found that these percentages decreased to 24 percent and 22 percent, respectively (Smith 1993:389). The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) also reports that the proportion of survey respondents classified as "hardcore anti-Semites" decreased from 29 percent in 1964 to 12 percent in 1998 (Dinnerstein 2004 ).
ADL.
1 Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has rekindled negative perceptions of Jews, as the distinction between aversion for Israeli politics and dislike for Jews becomes increasingly blurred (Brustein 2003:353) .
Such variation in anti-Jewish sentiments raises two questions that motivate this research. Who harbors anti-Jewish attitudes? And how might we theoretically explain variation in antiJewish prejudice? We investigate these questions and provide a theoretical account of contemporary anti-Semitic sentiment in the United States. Our theoretical account of anti-Semitism is grounded in Herbert Blumer's (1958) seminal work on prejudice and group position. We suggest that Blumer's thesis fostered two related yet distinct theoretical lineages. One line emphasizes the role of collective threat and out-group hostility, focusing largely on the effect of macro-level variation in minority group size and economic conditions on prejudice (Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995 Quillian , 1996 . A second line of research also emphasizes group threat as a paramount concept for understanding inter-group conflict, but gives greater attention to the position of individual group membership and perceptions of zero-sum gain. This group position perspective emphasizes the importance of group-or race-specific beliefs about society's opportunity structure and perceptions that gains by one group come at the expense of another (Bobo and Hutchings 1996) . We integrate these contemporary interpretations of Blumer to offer an explanatory model of present day anti-Semitism.
Our thesis represents an alternative to extant theories that emphasize the religious foundations of anti-Jewish attitudes (Dinnerstein 1994; Jaher 1994 ). While we do not discount the historical importance of religious tradition for understanding anti-Jewish sentiment, we contend that the relationship between religion and anti-Semitism has attenuated and does not adequately explain variation in prejudice against Jews in contemporary America. In contrast, we suggest that minority group members perceive the ascent of Jews to positions of power in politics and finance since the 1960s as coming at the expense of their own group's stake in the political and economic power structure. Given the dynamic and linked history between Jews and African Americans that entailed periods of both collaboration and conflict, we hypothesize that African Americans should be especially apt to harbor anti-Jewish sentiment. To wit, we build on the group position and collective threat models to suggest that anti-Semitic attitudes are most pronounced among racial and ethnic minorities and among individuals residing in places with large Jewish populations. At the same time, we suggest that religious fundamentalism should have little association with negative attitudes toward Jews once race and Jewish population size are taken into account.
We first review prior research on anti-Semitism in the United States, giving particular attention to the linked histories of minority groups and recent trends that provide a context for understanding anti-Jewish sentiments. Our focus then turns to extant explanations of anti-Semitism before presenting our theoretical model. Finally, we empirically test this model using data from the American Mosaic Survey (AMS), a national survey inquiring about perceptions of Jews in the United States (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006) .
Theory and Background

Social Sources of Anti-Semitic Attitudes
While research suggests that the proportion of the U.S. population harboring antiSemitic attitudes has declined in recent decades (Dinnerstein 2004; Rosenfield 1982; Smith 1993) , public opinion surveys suggest anti-Jewish attitudes and stereotypes persist among segments of the population (Anti-Defamation League 2002; Smith 1993 Smith , 1996 . Arguably the (Lerner and West 1996) . Jews' middleman status often allowed them to profit from African Americans' earnings resulting in unequal contact (Allport 1954) , thus fostering anti-Jewish sentiment within the African American community. 4 Jews often lived in close contact with African Americans, but at different status levels, and maintained unequal hiring and renting practices (Marx 1967; McDowell 1998) . While antagonistic relations between Jews and African Americans have tempered, collective memories in the African American community of past hostile relations with Jews may represent a form of cultural trauma (Alexander 2003 ) that informs contemporary anti-Semitic attitudes among African Americans.
In sum, prior work on anti-Semitism suggests that anti-Jewish sentiments are not randomly dispersed across the U.S. population. Rather, anti-Semitism is more prevalent among particular social groups, such as those with less education, racial minorities, and the lower classes. This raises the question, why are these groups more anti-Semitic? The vast majority of literature regarding anti-Semitism in America has been descriptive and not tied to more general theories of prejudice (Anti-Defamation League 2002; Lipset and Schneider 1978; Rosenfield 1982; Smith 1991 Smith , 1996 Stember 1966) , or gives substantial theoretical weight to the role of religion (Dinnerstein 1994; Jaher 1994) . Related work suggests anti-Semitism is a unique form of prejudice with unique cultural and historical precursors (Brustein 2003) . We offer a theoretical account that is consonant with explanations of racial prejudice. Specifically, Blumer's (1958) theory and contemporary work in this tradition provide a useful starting point for advancing an explanation of anti-Semitism that accounts for individual-level and aggregate-level correlates of anti-Jewish prejudice.
We present this explanation of anti-Semitism as an alternative to religious-based accounts. While we do not dismiss the importance of religion with respect to the historical emergence of anti-Semitism in the United States and abroad, we question whether religious affiliation continues to serve as the motivation behind anti-Jewish sentiment. We posit that, in the post-Enlightenment era, anti-Jewish discourse has taken on more secular forms, and thus we suggest the antecedents of anti-Semitism are also secular in nature. In particular, we contend that anti-Jewish hostility is more strongly associated with race than religion.
Linked Histories and Divergent Trends-toward Minority Anti-Semitism
While our analytic model does not investigate temporal variation in anti-Jewish sentiment, we suggest that several changes related to the Jewish community have resulted in waning anti-Semitism among Christian elites-those who are in the public eye and exert significant influence over Christian popular opinion. That change, we suggest, is balanced by an increase in negative attitudes toward Jews in marginalized racial communities, notably among African Americans.
Recent decades have witnessed sizeable gains by Jews in the realms of politics, medicine, and law. These gains have not conjured up perceptions of threat among the elite-Christian conservatives in particular-as Jews and Christian conservatives have increasingly found common ground in the political realm. Since World War II and into the present day, a marked shift has occurred such that Jews have assimilated into the religious establishment ecumenically, defined expansively as a Protestant-Catholic-Jew triad, and signified in the post-war religious conception of America as a Judeo-Christian nation, rather than a Christian nation (Glock 1993; Herberg 1983 ). In addition, mutual support for Israel is now a key factor bridging Jewish and Christian conservative interests (Friedman 2003) . The association between Jews and extreme leftist politics that had long garnered resentment among conservatives (Brustein 2003) has subdued in recent decades. While Jews still generally support Democratic over Republican candidates, Jewish political leanings have nonetheless moderated and become increasingly complex. For instance, a 1997 survey of Jewish respondents showed that younger and orthodox Jews increasingly share common ground with Christian fundamentalists (Friedman 2003) . Hence, there has been movement among Jews toward mutual agreement on issues important to Christian conservatives, which might temper negative sentiments toward Jews among the Christian elite.
If overlapping interests have buffered against perceptions of Jewish threat among white Christian conservatives, at least two reasons indicate that perceptions of Jews have turned sour among African Americans. One important reason concerns the peculiar history of African American-Jewish relations and Jewish movement away from active support for African Americans in civil rights causes. Historically, Jews often perceived similarities between racism and anti-Semitism (Diner 1997) . Given their own history of oppression, Jews selectively aided African American efforts to eliminate racism and anti-Semitism due to their mutual self-interest and relatively similar racialization within America's racial hierarchy (Diner 1997 (Diner , 1998 Greenberg 1997; Lerner and West 1996) . To this effort, the turn of the century found Jews devoting significant financial and organizational resources in both the founding of civil rights organizations as well as organizations seeking to improve the material and educational conditions of African Americans (Friedman 1998; Lewis 1997; Weiss 1997) . However, this aid was often predicated on Jews' differing perceptions of whether or not they would be aided or further discriminated against following these efforts. Jews rarely attempted to aid African Americans if their own tenuous position of relative success compared to African Americans would be compromised.
Much has been written about perhaps the most visible and progressive efforts at collaboration between Jews and African Americans-Jewish involvement in equal rights movements throughout the twentieth century. The labor movement forged some of the first meaningful and lasting ties between Jews and African Americans as advocates of all races sought to build a class-based movement to unite workers (Hill 1998; Stevenson 1998) . During the civil rights movements, Jews actively participated in every major organization and allied with African Americans on civil rights issues (Friedman 1998; Weiss 1997) . As Nathan Glazer (1984) states, "It is well known that Jews and Afro-Americans were closely allied in the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s" (p. 105). For example, of the approximately 1,000 northern white students who traveled south to participate in Freedom Summer 1964, a disproportionate number were Jews, many of whom stayed long after the summer was over to contribute to the civil rights effort (Salzman 1997) .
After 1970, however, "longstanding differences over such issues as community control of school districts, affirmative action, the role of Israel in world politics, open admissions at universities, and the open anti-Semitism of some controversial African American leaders began to outweigh mutually perceived common interests, which for decades had worked to cement cooperation between significant segments of both groups" (Forman 1997:121) . The rise of nationalism among the African American population and the Jewish invasion of Israel's West Bank found African Americans identifying with Palestinians (Buhle and Kelley 1997; Martin 1997; Rubin 1997) . Mutual interests and successes that united the groups during the 1960s waned thereafter, as Jewish and African American leaders largely disagreed on a variety of emerging issues (Glazer 1984) . African Americans turned inwards and expelled whites, many of whom were Jews, from their organizations (Lerner and West 1996) . Moreover, while economic conditions continued to improve for Jews, those of African Americans did not do so at the same rate (Glazer 1984) . The combination of international affairs (i.e., Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and domestic disagreements drove "a deep wedge of resentment between Jews and [African]-Americans" (Washington 1984:14) .
As Jews became "white" (Brodkin 1999; Goldstein 2006; Jacobson 1998; Prell 1999 ) and acquired more resources in society, many did not explicitly seek to provide African Americans with assistance in gaining access to or a hand up on the economic ladder, as some had imagined they would (Lerner and West 1996) . Instead, many Jews believed that if they should succeed, African Americans should as well, which may have resulted in a betrayal-based anti-Semitism. 5 In light of this history, African Americans may no longer consign a fellow victim or minority status on Jews, as was more common during civil rights struggles (Bauman and Kalin 1998; Salzman and West 1997; Schneier 1999) . Both contemporary antagonisms and collective memories of Jewish exploitation of African Americans may thus contribute to resentment and negative feelings toward Jews within segments of the African American population.
A second reason why anti-Jewish attitudes may be elevated in the minority, namely African American, community is that minorities may view gains by other groups as coming at their own expense. As Lawrence Bobo and Vincent Hutchings (1996) articulate in their influential work, out-group prejudice partly stems from perceptions of zero-sum competition among minority groups. From this perspective, minority groups perceive the acquisition of economic and political capital by Jews as coming at their expense. On account of the postcivil rights fissure between African Americans and Jews combined with the idea of zero-sum gain, we expect that anti-Jewish sentiment is currently more pronounced among non-whites relative to whites, and this association should be particularly strong for African Americans because of their unique history with Jews.
We do not test temporal variation in anti-Jewish attitudes in this work. However, we argue that since Jews have taken ideological steps toward Christian elites (Friedman 2003) and Christian conservatives have not witnessed a loss of power in recent decades, there would be little discursive or practical utility in expressing anti-Semitic sentiments. At the same time, the split between Jews and African Americans following the civil rights movement yielded a sense of alienation that is conducive to prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings 1996) . A contemporary sampling of Americans should thus show elevated anti-Jewish sentiment among African Americans and little negativity among Christian conservatives. Little research exists on other minority attitudes toward Jews, such as Hispanics. We expect that Hispanics will express more negative sentiment toward Jews than whites, yet less than African Americans because Hispanics do not share the same contentious history with Jews. We further suggest that these predictions align with a broader theoretical framework that emphasizes the salience of group position, alienation, and group threat in the study of inter-group conflict.
A Group Position Model of Anti-Semitism
In his classic work on prejudice, Blumer (1958) argued "race prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than a set of feelings which members of one racial group have toward the members of another racial group" (p. 3). That is, members of racial groups define themselves relative to other races, and prejudice emerges when one group perceives a collective threat by another. Dominant group members, in particular, feel a sense of entitlement and superiority, and thus "the greater the sense of threat to their prerogatives, the more likely are members of the dominant group to express prejudice against threatening outsiders" (Quillian 1995:588) . Contemporary work suggests this "threat" framework is also applicable to prejudice among minorities (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Tropp and Pettigrew 2005 ).
Blumer's thesis has generated two related lines of research on prejudice and inter-group hostility. One line of research emphasizes individual's group membership vis-à-vis other groups and their psychological perceptions of zero-sum competition. This idea is captured in Bobo and Hutchings' work (1996;  for related argument see Bobo 1988; Bobo et al. 1994 ) on perceptions of racial group competition in multiracial social contexts. Bobo and Hutchings' (1996 p. 956 ) model suggests that "members of a racial group who feel alienated and 5. A number of scholars (see especially Greenberg 1997; Lerner and West 1996; Webb 2003) have argued that Jews' inattention and inaction with regard to African Americans' depressed economic conditions constitutes a particular betrayal given Jews' earlier arguments of the groups' linked fates and the expectation that if Jews ever "made it" they would help African Americans to do so. oppressed are more likely to regard other racial groups as competitive threats to their own group's social position" (p. 956). Importantly for our research, Bobo and Hutchings' reworking of Blumer's themes explains prejudice among minorities in addition to dominant groups. Individuals who perceive that their racial or ethnic group has historically been alienated, disenfranchised, and subject to unfair treatment are more apt to perceive members of other groups as competing for social resources such as employment or political power (Bayor 1988) . Expanding on Blumer's thesis, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) add that "feelings of alienation and threat are the product of social and collective processes that derive from long-term experiences and conditions that members of a racial group have faced. These feelings are shaped, as Blumer argued, by an "ongoing process of collective social definition that cannot be reduced to the current status of individuals" (in Bobo and Hutchings 1996: 956-7) .
The framework for understanding prejudice put forth by Blumer, and later Bobo and Hutchings, suggests three propositions germane to contemporary anti-Semitism. First, prejudice results from collectively held beliefs about one group's position relative to an out-group. In our case, minority groups that do not directly compete with Jews would nonetheless view Jews as a definable out-group. Second, prejudice stems from a long-term, ongoing process of intergroup relations. For our case, African Americans and Jews have a history of shared collaboration, yet such collaboration was neither persistent nor uniform. As discussed in the previous section, a feeling of alienation arose among the African American community after the "golden years" (Berson 1971) or the "grand alliance" (Glazer 1984) between African Americans and Jews during the civil rights movement. The cessation of large-scale collaboration between African Americans and Jews, combined with limited economic advancement by African Americans during the 1970s, would be conducive to resentment. Third, and in line with Bobo and Hutchings (1996) , groups that feel alienated and oppressed are more apt to regard out-groups as threatening to their own position. That argument is critical in that minorities, and not just dominant groups, are prone to view out-groups negatively. African Americans represent a racial group that has been alienated and oppressed throughout U.S. history and would thus be apt to evaluate their status relative to other groups.
While those propositions provide leverage for understanding contemporary anti-Jewish attitudes, we do not employ Blumer's model uncritically. Blumer's framework does not account well for negative feelings toward groups that are not frequently in direct competition, such as Jews and African Americans. Also, we maintain that the group threat model would not account for our contention that anti-Semitism is largely absent for groups with niche overlap, such as Jews and Christian fundamentalists. While still working within the group position framework, we articulate three points that partly revise Blumer's model. First, we emphasize resentment as a counterpart to realistic group threat. If two groups share a history of oppression, yet one group attains power in society more so than the other, then resentment and prejudice may ensue among the persistently marginalized group. Given the economic success of Jews in modern America relative to other minorities (Lipset 1990 ), such resentment is most likely found among non-Jewish minority groups. Second, we emphasize the importance of linked histories , which might be inferred but is not explicitly articulated in Blumer's (1958) work. Resentment and associated prejudice may be particularly likely where groups share a history of subordination and collaboration that suddenly ceases due to ideological shifts or the emergence of competing interests. Such "group history" would further suggest race-specific findings, as historical relations between Jews and African Americans are not paralleled by Hispanic-Jewish or Asian-Jewish relations. Third, we draw attention to relative success . The political and economic success of Jews in recent decades was not matched by a loss of power among Christian elites. Thus, there is little practical or discursive utility in elite expressions of prejudice because of Jewish gains. At the same time, gains by Jews were not matched by equivalent gains among African Americans as a collective group. Those divergent trends may engender resentment among African Americans that is not paralleled by Christian elites. This modification of Blumer's thesis largely aligns with Bobo's (1999:458) contention that perceptions of threat do not simply reflect realistic material conditions. Given our focus on linked histories combined with differential trajectories of power and economic success, we suggest that African Americans are more apt to harbor anti-Jewish sentiments than non-Jewish whites. A similar but weaker association is expected for Hispanics because, like African Americans, they have been marginalized in American society yet they do not share the same linked history with Jews. We hypothesize that anti-Jewish sentiment is more prevalent among African Americans and, to a lesser extent, among Hispanics relative to whites.
A second avenue of scholarship extending from Blumer's seminal work expounds what Quillian (1995) refers to as "collective threat" (p. 586). This perspective also suggests that prejudice toward minority groups increases when minorities are perceived as threatening to another group's prerogatives. Where groups are perceived as threatening to existing power structures or increasing competition for valuable but limited resources, then other groups are likely to express prejudice. The collective threat thesis differs from the group position argument in that it focuses largely on aggregate level factors. Researchers typically measure such collective threat via two indicators: (1) the size of the minority group, and (2) economic conditions (Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995) . To that end, the collective threat hypothesis that group size and economic conditions are associated with manifestations of prejudice is supported by research on anti-immigrant sentiment (Quillian 1995) , anti-Semitism (Brustein 2003; McWilliams 2005) , right-wing voting (Giles and Buckner 1993; Knigge 1998) , and views toward race-targeting policies (Giles and Evans 1986; Quillian 1996 ; see also Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; see Fox 2004 on Hispanic population size and views on racial policy).
With respect to anti-Semitism, the collective threat hypothesis suggests attitudes toward Jews should vary with the size of the Jewish population, net of individual level factors. Prior research using nations as the units of analysis suggests Jewish population size and falling gross domestic product are associated with anti-Jewish policies and discourse (Brustein 2003 ), yet empirical work on the relationship between Jewish population size, economic conditions, and individual anti-Jewish sentiment is scant. In line with the collective threat hypothesis, we propose that anti-Jewish sentiment is positively associated with the relative size of the Jewish population and inversely related to the employment rate in the respondent's community.
Finally, we suggest that the relationship between minority group status and anti-Semitism may be particularly evident when minority group members reside in places with large Jewish populations. As Blalock (1967) suggests, the presence of out-groups increases perceptions of competition. Our third hypothesis integrates the collective threat and group position models to propose the following: Anti-Jewish sentiment among minority group members is exacerbated as the size of the Jewish population in the area increases.
This argument is posited as an alternative to largely religious based accounts (Dinnerstein 1994). We contend that religion is weakly associated with attitudes toward Jews, particularly when respondent's race is taken into account.
Data, Methods, and Variables
We empirically test our hypotheses using data from the 2003 AMS, a national telephone survey of adults living in the United States using random digit dialing and computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) (Edgell et al. 2006) . The University of Wisconsin Survey Center (UWSC) administered the survey to 2,081 adults during the summer of 2003, with the objective of gathering information on attitudes about race, religion, politics, and American identity, as well as background characteristics of respondents.
Households were randomly selected, and then respondents were randomly selected within households. African Americans and Hispanics were over-sampled to assure adequate representation of these populations for making comparisons across racial groups. This oversampling was accomplished by calling more heavily in areas that had high concentrations of African Americans and Hispanics. 6 In this analysis we include only non-Jewish respondents. Excluding the forty-one Jewish respondents (2 percent of the sample) was necessary because we are particularly interested in comparisons across racial groups. Including Jews in the sample biases such comparisons because Jews are predominately white and practically no Jewish respondents expressed anti-Semitic sentiments.
The survey response rate was 36 percent, which compares favorably with the response rates that most national RDD-based studies achieve.
7 More importantly than the response rate is nonresponse bias and the extent to which the data are representative of the population of interest. The response rate for the present data falls below that typically achieved by the General Social Survey (GSS), yet research suggests few systematic differences between higher response rates (50 to 60 percent) and RDD surveys achieving rates between 27 and 36 percent with respect to demographic and attitudinal indicators (Keeter et al. 2000) . In line with this assessment, our data compare well with other national surveys such as the GSS and the Current Population Survey (CPS) on responses to a selection of a demographic, belief, and behavioral measures. 
Dependent Variables
We measure anti-Semitic beliefs in the United States using three indicators that tap different facets of prejudice or aversion toward Jews. We refrained from asking overt questions about "disliking Jews" or "avoiding hospitals with Jewish doctors" because such verbiage may elicit socially desirable answers or subjects may refuse to respond. We instead chose questions that are entrenched in the literature on anti-Jewish sentiment and indicate either an aversion toward Jews (e.g., disapprove of a family member marrying a Jew), a concern about Jewish influence (e.g., Jewish power in society), or express suspicion about Jewish commitment to this country (Jewish loyalties). These indicators allow an analysis of prejudice against Jews while minimizing the risk of desirability effects. Our three indicators are described in detail below. . Their study shows that the current mean response rate for RDD telephone surveys is just over ten percent. Additionally, the most recent American National Election Study (ANES) had a response rate of 35 percent (National Elections Studies 2002). The AMS response rate, using the same method of calculation, is 36 percent (Edgell 2006 et al) .
8. For instance, about 59 percent of our sample is married, mirroring the CPS figure (U.S. Census Bureau 2003) . According to the 2000 GSS estimates, 24 percent percent of the country identifies as Catholic, while our sample is 25.5 percent (General Social Survey 2000). Our sample is also similar to the national average in education, with 24 percent of AMS and CPS respondents having a college degree. The AMS sample also represents the racial groups that were oversampled in our survey design quite well. For example, 18.9 percent of African American AMS respondents had college degrees compared to 17 percent of CPS respondents. Also, the AMS and GSS samples have comparable proportions of African American Republicans (14.8 percent versus 12.1 percent) and African Americans attend church weekly at similar rates in both samples (17 percent versus 19 percent). Comparisons with the GSS are not possible for Hispanics because the GSS does not contain information on this racial group. Also, we do not make direct comparisons with the GSS questions about Jews because the questions are asked in a slightly different form and, more importantly, the response choices differ from ours. Thus, direct comparisons are not possible. But based on available comparisons, these descriptive statistics suggest that our sample is consistent with the GSS and CPS, which increases our confidence in valid statistical inference (see Edgell et. al. 2006 , Table S1 , for additional comparisons).
9. Asking questions about prejudiced attitudes can potentially make respondents uncomfortable. We tried to minimize this by ensuring anonymity, repeating that the respondent should not provide his or her name, and describing how the respondent was randomly selected.
Zion
10 asserted that Jews sought world power and domination, thus fueling perceptions of Jews as power hungry and having a hidden agenda (Brustein 2003:273-8) . Similar concerns were prevalent in the United States, evidenced by the anti-Semitic content of Henry Ford's Dearborn Independent and Father Charles Edward Coughlin's Social Justice . Jews continue to face frequent accusations of cornering markets and being overly ambitious toward enterprise (Dinnerstein 1994:62) . Accordingly, numerous surveys of anti-Semitism since the 1960s have included questions concerning Jewish power (Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Stember 1966). 11 Specifically, respondents in our sample were asked, "Compared to other groups today in the United States, do you think Jews have too much power and influence, too little, or about the right amount?" Response choices were (1) too much power, (2) too little power, (3) about the right amount, or (4) did not know. The majority of non-Jewish respondents in our sample believed that Jews had about the right amount of power (68 percent), followed by those believing Jews had too much power (15 percent), unsure (11 percent), and too little (6 percent). In our analyses we dichotomize this variable so that respondents believing Jews have too much power are coded 1 and other responses are coded 0.
12
Our second measure of anti-Jewish sentiment queried about Jewish loyalties to the United States. As with concerns about Jewish power, the belief that Jews have divided loyalties and lack patriotic fervor has historically been a manifestation of anti-Jewish sentiment in the United States (Dinnerstein 1994:76; Smith 1993 Smith , 1996 , Europe (Brustein 2003:95-97) , and South America (Avni 1971) . Likewise, this indicator is consistent with past studies of antiSemitism in America (see Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Stember 1966; Wuthnow 1982) . We asked respondents the following question: "As a group, do you think Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America, more loyal to America than Israel, or equally loyal to both?" The majority (50 percent) said they were equally loyal to both, followed by those believing Jews were more loyal to Israel (21 percent), to America (17.5 percent), and just under 12 percent were not sure (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). For our analysis, we created a dummy variable where "more loyal to Israel" is coded 1 and other response categories are coded 0.
Our last measure entailed a more personal question about perceptions of a son or daughter marrying a Jew. This variable is measured in three categories, where respondents are coded as (1) disapproving of their son or daughter marrying a Jewish person (11 percent of respondents), (2) approving (25 percent), or (3) expressing indifference (64 percent). As with our other two indicators, we inquired about perceptions of Jewish marriage because this variable appears in prior surveys and taps a more personal facet of anti-Jewish sentiment than abstract questions about Jewish power and loyalties. This dependent variable, however, was not asked of all respondents in the AMS. A random selection of approximately half of the respondents was asked this question ( N = 1,031 valid responses). Due to the random draw of respondents, those asked this question do not systematically differ from respondents not receiving this question, and the large subsample gives us ample statistical power to assess variation in perceptions of Jewish marriage. We retain the three categories of this dependent variable to juxtapose those overtly agreeing versus disagreeing with Jewish marriage.
We analyze each dependent variable separately in our analyses. The three anti-Semitism indicators are significantly correlated, where respondents that believe Jews have too much power also believe Jews are more loyal to Israel ( r = .27, p < .001). Both variables are also significantly correlated with perceived disapproval of a family member marrying a Jewish person, 10. For a full discussion of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (originally published in 1905 by the Russian Secret Police), including content and repercussions for Jews, see Ben-Itto (2005) , Bronner (2003) , Cohn (1996) , Jacobs and Weitzman (2003) , and Segal and Levy (1996) .
11. See also the 1975-76 Yankolovich survey (cited in Smith 1993:137-87) . 12. We dichotomize to allow a logistic regression analysis predicting the category consistent with anti-Jewish sentiment. As we articulate later in the article, analyses that maintain the four categories of the variables yielded the same substantive results. but the respective correlations were below .20. Hence, although responses are significantly correlated, the correlations were not strong enough to warrant creating an anti-Semitism index (Cronbach's alpha for the three variables is .45). The rather low alpha reliability coefficient is not necessarily surprising given that the three variables inquire about rather different facets of anti-Jewish sentiment, ranging from abstract thoughts about loyalties and power to individual feelings about having Jewish family. As referenced above, each of these indicators was employed in prior research on anti-Semitism, and we expect that our predictor variables will have largely consistent effects on the three outcome variables when analyzing them independently. We add that our substantive results are largely consistent when indexing the three measures into a single outcome variable. We report the results of those analyses in Table A -3 in the Appendix.
Independent Variables
We begin our analysis by examining the correlation between anti-Jewish sentiment and religious affiliation. Our non-Jewish sample consisted largely of Christian adherents, including a large proportion of Protestants (56 percent) and Catholics (25 percent). Approximately 10 percent and 9 percent of our sample, respectively, associated themselves with other religions or with no religion at all. 13 We also investigate religious conservatism based largely on Smith's (1987) categorization.
14 Another focal variable in our analysis is the respondent's race. Since we are primarily interested in how non-whites differ from whites regarding anti-Semitic attitudes, our variable includes four categories: African American (21 percent), white (58 percent), Hispanic (13 percent), and other races (7 percent). As stated earlier, the percentage of African Americans and Hispanics in our sample is larger than what is found in the general population because we over-sampled in areas with high concentrations of these demographic groups. We also indicate the respondent's family nativity. Respondents reporting they are non-citizens or that one of their parents was born outside the Unites States were coded 1, while citizens and those with both parents born in the U.S. were coded 0.
Our next set of independent variables is measured at the county level. Specifically, we include the county civilian employment rate and the number of Jews per 1,000 residents in the county. Employment data are taken from the 2000 U.S. Census, and we calculate the employment rate as the number of persons 16-years-old or older employed in the civilian labor force divided by the sum of persons 16 years of age or older either employed in the civilian labor force, unemployed in the civilian labor force, or not in the labor force, and then multiply this figure by 100. In line with recent group threat arguments finding that the size of the minority population is associated with prejudice (Giles and Evans 1986; Quillian 1995) , we also include an estimate for the number of Jews in the respondent's county. The U.S. Census Bureau is prohibited from collecting information on religious affiliation. However, estimates of the Jewish population are collected and furnished by the Glenmary Research Center (Jones et al. 2000) . We include as a measure of "Jewish threat" the rate of Jews per 1,000 in the general population. 15 Since both county-level measures are based on 2000 estimates and the dependent variable is measured in mid-year 2003, there is an approximate three-year lag. This lag is potentially beneficial because these independent variables temporally precede the measurement of our dependent variable.
We statistically control for several other variables potentially influencing anti-Jewish sentiment. We control for sex (male coded 1), age, and employment status (unemployed and looking for work coded 1; else coded 0). We measure education as an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (less than a high school diploma) to 6 (post-graduate education). 16 We also include a dummy variable in the multivariate models to control for Protestant conservatism and another dummy variable for residence in the South. In order to examine the effects of our predictor variables on concerns about Jewish power, loyalties and marriage, we also control for perceptions of Jewish assimilation in American society. Prior work on anti-Semitism suggests that anti-Jewish sentiment prior to WWII often entailed stereotypes that Jews were clannish, aloof, or unrooted (Brustein 2003; Brustein and King 2004) and resistant to assimilation into predominately non-Jewish societies. In response, extant inquiries asked respondents whether they believe Jews are more apt to "stick together," "care for their own kind," or if they are becoming "like other Americans" (for review see Smith 1993:390) . Respondents in 13. Our "other religious affiliation" category included a small number of Muslims (7), Buddhists (13), and Hindus (11), as well as 164 respondents from numerous smaller religious sects. We did not have information to further classify these 164 respondents.
14. See Appendix 2 of Smith's (1987) work. What that scheme classifies as "fundamentalist" is essentially what we refer to as "conservative."
15. For a thorough description of the methodology for collecting data on religious affiliation, see Jones et al. (2000:vii-xviii) .
16. In other analyses we controlled for income, measured as the family's pre-tax income in the year prior to the survey. Income had little impact on our respective outcome variables and did not alter the effects of our theoretically informed indicators. For these reasons, and because the income variable included many missing cases, we omitted this variable from the analyses shown here. the AMS were asked, "Do you think Jews are becoming more like other Americans, less like other Americans, or are they staying about the same?" We dichotomize this indicator so the response "less like other Americans" is coded 1 and other responses are coded 0.
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Finally, our theoretical argument predicts that the effect of race on anti-Semitism is conditioned by the presence of Jews in the respondent's county. To test this proposition we include a set of interaction terms for the race dummy variables and Jewish population size. Consistent with our integrated group threat approach, we expect that the association between Jewish population size and anti-Semitism is more pronounced for non-whites, and particularly for African Americans, relative to whites.
Method and Analytic Strategy
We begin our analysis with a set of cross-tabulations to investigate the bivariate relationships between religion, race, and our dependent variables. We then run a series of multivariate models to statistically control for other potential correlates of anti-Semitism and to examine the impact of county employment rate and Jewish population size on anti-Semitic attitudes, net of individual background characteristics. For the analyses of Jewish power and Jewish loyalties, the dependent variables are coded as dichotomous indicators with '1' indicating "too much power" or "more loyal to Israel." We thus use binary logistic regression models to investigate the impact of our independent variables on these anti-Jewish outcomes. Coefficients in logistic regression models reveal the effect of a one unit increase in the predictor variable on the log-odds of a respondent being in a category of the dependent variable (coded 1) relative to a reference category (coded 0; see Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1994:342) . We use a related estimator-multinomial logistic regression-for our Jewish marriage dependent variable. Multinomial logistic regression is suitable for variables with more than two categories and like the binary logistic model, coefficients can be interpreted as the increase in the odds of the dependent variable (relative to a reference category) per unit increase in a continuous or dichotomous independent variable.
Our sample includes some respondents that reside in the same county, although there are fewer than three respondents per county on average. Nonetheless, that some respondents live in the same geographic unit raises the possibility of correlated errors and hence inflated t -values. We remedy this by adjusting the standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimation of variance for clustered data, which relaxes the assumption of independence of the observations and incorporates a correction on the calculation of the standard error to take into account non-independence of units (Rogers 1993) . Using the cluster option (in Stata 9.1) with robust standard errors performs well compared to models without a correction and compared to random effects models (Stata 2001:257) .
Our substantive results largely replicate when we incorporate sample weights. 18 We present results from the unweighted sample in this work because the weights are a function of the independent variables. Christopher Winship and Larry Radbill (1994) suggest when this is the case and few substantive differences exist between the weighted and unweighted data, the latter is encouraged. As mentioned above, we also considered creating a single anti-Semitism index based on our three outcome indicators. One could argue that the three 17. A reviewer suggested that we interact this assimilation indicator with race. Few respondents (5 percent) viewed Jews as becoming less like other Americans, including a small number of non-white respondents. Hence, the interaction coefficients and standard errors were unusually large for this interaction term, which decreases our confidence in the substance of that interaction. Therefore, we do not report those findings here.
18. We were able to compare weighted and unweighted data for the full sample, which includes our analysis of Jewish power and Jewish loyalties, as well as Table A-2 in the Appendix. These results were substantively similar, although the interaction effect for Hispanics did not reach statistical significance ( p < .05) and the conservative Protestant coefficients were weaker. Sample weights were not separately constructed for the subsample questions, and thus we could not make comparisons between weighted and unweighted samples for perceptions of Jewish marriage.
indicators tap unique dimensions of a latent anti-Semitism construct. Therefore, we created an index and employed an ordered logit model for this ordinal variable, and the substantive results with respect to race, Jewish population size, and their interaction agreed with independent logistic regression models presented in the text. We include this ordered logit model in the Appendix (Table A-3). 19
Results
Religion and Anti-Semitism
As stated earlier, we present our theory partly as an alternative to religious accounts of anti-Semitism. Since existing theoretical and empirical work on anti-Jewish attitudes stresses the importance of religion for understanding this form of prejudice, we begin by examining how religious affiliation and religious conservatism affect anti-Semitism. Contrary to explicitly religious accounts, our bivariate analysis yields no significant association between religious affiliation and beliefs that Jews hold too much power in society or that Jews are more loyal to Israel than the United States (Table 2 ). There is, however, a statistically significant association between religious affiliation and attitudes toward family marrying a Jewish person, although the differences appear marginal. Catholics (11 percent) and Protestants (13 percent) are slightly more likely to disapprove of a son or daughter marrying a Jewish person relative to other religions (9 percent) and respondents not identifying with a religion (6 percent).
We next test whether religious conservatism and stronger commitment to one's church might matter more than denominational affiliation alone. In order to test this proposition, we analyze anti-Jewish sentiment and religious conservatism for Protestants in our sample. 20 As depicted in Table 3 , moderate and conservative Protestants are somewhat more likely to view Jews as holding too much power, with 16 percent of conservative Protestants expressing this belief compared to 9 percent of liberal Protestants. That difference, however, is not statistically significant. A sizeable percentage of conservative Protestants (26 percent) believe Jews are more loyal to Israel than America, and conservative Protestants are more apt to disapprove of a son or daughter marrying a Jew (19 percent) than moderate (4 percent) or liberal Protestants (13 percent). In apparent contrast to our hypothesis that religion has no significant effect on attitudes toward Jews, these bivariate results suggest Protestant conservatism influences attitudes toward Jews. Yet, African Americans in our sample are proportionately more likely to identify as conservative Protestants than other races. We thus examine the bivariate association between race and anti-Jewish sentiment before assessing race and religion independently in our regression models.
Race and Anti-Semitism
Our results indicate a consistent association between race and anti-Semitism. As shown in Table 4 , the bivariate association between race and each of the three dependent variables is 19. A few additional methodological notes are warranted. We employed multinomial logistic regression models using all four categories for the Jewish loyalty and Jewish power dependent variables, respectively. Again, the substantive story we tell with the binary logistic regression models is consistent with the multinomial models. We report the binary logistic models in the text because a likelihood ratio test indicated that some categories could be combined and also because the binary logit models simplify the analysis while telling the same substantive story (the multinomial tables are available from the first author upon request). Also, we did not pursue an HML model because of the small number of cases in most counties, which posed degrees of freedom problems.
20. We isolate this analysis to Protestants because this was the only denomination in our sample with sufficient numbers identifying as liberal, moderate, and conservative to yield meaningful results. statistically significant, and the differences between whites and non-whites are sizeable. For instance, African Americans are nearly two and a half times more likely than whites to believe Jews have too much power in society (24 percent versus 10 percent), a difference nearly matched by Hispanics (19 percent) and other racial groups (20 percent). We also find statistically significant differences when examining Jewish loyalties. African Americans (31 percent) are most likely to view Jews as more loyal to Israel than the United States, compared to about 26 percent of non-black Hispanics, 26 percent of other races, and 15 percent of whites. Differences are less substantial when looking at Jewish marriage. But again the groups most likely to disapprove of a son or daughter marrying a Jewish person are African Americans (15 percent) and Hispanics (13 percent) compared to whites (10 percent) and other races (7 percent). Race, it appears, is a non-trivial correlate of anti-Jewish sentiment. We further examine race, religion and anti-Jewish attitudes net of other potential covariates in the next section.
Multivariate Analysis
We present four models for each of our three outcome variables in Tables 5 through 7. Model 1 in Table 5 shows the effects of the control variables and Protestant conservatism on Source: American Mosaic Survey Note: Chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio for Jewish power is 5.9/2 ( N = 897). This ratio for Jewish loyalties is 13.7/2 ( N = 894), and the ratio for Jewish marriage is 12.9/4 ( N = 479). The latter model includes four degrees of freedom because three categories of the variable were included (approve, disapprove, indifferent), although we only report the percentages for disapproval in the ). Hispanics, however, are not different from whites on this measure when we control for whether respondents have a foreign born parent. Identifying as Hispanic relative to white, a difference that was significant in a bivariate analysis (see Table 4 ), loses statistical significance when the 'foreign parent' indicator is included in the model. This suggests Hispanics are no more apt to believe Jews possess too much power in society than whites. Rather, the bivariate correlation is likely attributable to more Hispanics in our sample having foreign-born parents, who in turn believe Jews hold too much power (Table 5 , Model 2). What is particularly interesting in Model 2 of Table 5 is the drastic change in the conservative Protestant coefficient compared to Model 1. That coefficient nearly reduces to zero and is not statistically significant once race is considered in the model. In contrast to Leonard Dinnerstein's (1994:197-8) argument that African Americans are apt to express anti-Semitic sentiments because of their conservative religious culture, our results turn this argument on its head. We find that conservative Protestants in our sample more likely express anti-Jewish sentiment largely because African Americans are disproportionately conservative Protestants.
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The substantive results in Table 5 become more intriguing in the last two models, which consider aggregate level characteristics and their interaction with race. Model 3, for instance, indicates that respondents in areas with larger Jewish populations are more likely to perceive Jews as having too much power, consistent with collective threat arguments on prejudice (Quillian 1995) . Economic conditions, however, are unrelated to perceptions of power. Also noteworthy, the coefficient for 'other race' is no longer statistically significant once aggregate conditions are included in the model. This category of respondents may harbor perceptions of Jewish power partly because they reside in places with larger Jewish populations. Finally, Model 4 suggests an interaction between race and Jewish population size. African Americans in areas with no Jews remain significantly more likely than whites to perceive Jews as having too much power ( b = .651), yet this effect increases in magnitude as the Jewish population increases. African Americans residing in counties where the Jewish population is one standard deviation above the mean are more than three times as likely as whites to see Jews as ). 22 The interaction coefficients also suggest a nuanced relationship between Hispanics and attitudes toward Jews. While the odds of perceiving Jews as wielders of too much power decrease by over 30 percent (e Ϫ.389 ) for Hispanics in counties where no Jews reside, the interaction coefficient indicates that Hispanics living in places where the Jewish population is one standard deviation above the mean are more likely to see Jews as having too much power (odds increase by 71 percent, e Ϫ.389 + .015 [61.6] ). This interaction underscores the utility of integrating the group position and collective threat perspectives, where race is partly contingent on Jewish population size.
Next, we present the coefficients for Jewish loyalties in Table 6 . Model 1 in Table 6 shows that the odds of viewing Jews as more loyal to Israel are 55 percent (e .439
) greater for conservative Protestants. Yet, that coefficient reduces by over 40 percent when race is introduced in Model 2. The effect of race on perceptions of Jewish loyalty nearly mirrors that in Table 5 (Jewish power). African Americans, along with respondents classified in the 'other race' category, are significantly more likely than whites to see Jews as more loyal to Israel. Model 3 suggests Jewish population size is not significantly associated with perceptions of Jewish loyalty, contrary to its correlation with perceptions of Jewish power, yet Jewish population size again interacts with race (Model 4). African Americans that do not reside near any Jews are more apt to view Jews as more loyal to Israel than whites (b = .410), yet this effect becomes stronger for African Americans residing in places with larger Jewish populations (see interaction coefficient). In related fashion, Hispanics are essentially no different from whites with respect to Jewish loyalties if Hispanics reside in counties with no Jewish residents (b = .003). Yet, perceptions of loyalty to Israel are stronger for Hispanics residing in areas with more Jews. Combined with the results in Table 5 , we interpret this interaction as further supporting an integration of the collective threat and group position arguments advanced by Quillian (1995) and Bobo and Hutchings (1996) , respectively. We also point out that when the interaction term is included in Model 4 of Table 6 , the conservative Protestant coefficient weakens and loses statistical significance (b = .223). This reinforces our argument that race, more so than religion, drives attitudes toward Jews.
Finally, Table 7 presents a similar set of models for our third dependent variable, attitudes concerning a child marrying a Jewish person, which we assess using multinomial logistic regression. A three-category multinomial model includes two sets of comparisons, one comparing those who disapprove versus approve of marrying a Jewish person (labeled 1a through 4a) and another comparing those who are indifferent versus approvers (labeled 1b through 4b). As we are primarily interested in disapprovers relative to approvers, we largely focus on columns 1a through 4a. Model 1 shows that conservative Protestants are more likely to disapprove as opposed to approve of their child marrying a Jewish person (column 1a, b = .558). However, the conservative Protestant coefficient reduces in magnitude (b = .427) and is no longer a statistically significant predictor of disapproval with Jewish marriage when race is introduced in Model 2. Race is again an important variable, as the odds of disapproving of a child marrying a Jew increase by 86 percent for African American respondents relative to whites (e .618 , column 2a). In contrast to the other dependent variables, however, Models 3 and 4 indicate no significant association between aggregate conditions and attitudes toward marrying a Jewish person, neither in the main effects nor the interaction models.
We highlight three main findings from our regression models. First, our results suggest a robust association between race and anti-Jewish sentiment. For all three outcome variables, African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to harbor anti-Jewish attitudes. Moreover, we find little evidence that Hispanics have different views toward Jews than whites based on the main effects models. Second, with respect to abstract ideas about Jewish loyalties and Jewish power, race is partly contingent on Jewish population size. For both 22 . We estimate the interaction term odds ratio by taking the anti-log of the main effect coefficient (e.g., .651 for 'African American') added to the product of the interaction coefficient (.009) and the value of Jewish population size (61.6). African Americans and Hispanics, negative attitudes toward Jews increase with the size of the Jewish population. The interaction between group position, as indicated through race, and social structure suggests utility in merging ideas consonant with Blumer (1958; in Bobo and Hutchings 1996) with ideas stemming from Blalock's (1967; in Quillian 1996) theory of inter-group relations. This interaction was not significant for questions of a more personal nature, such as our question concerning Jewish marriage. In that case, structural covariates were not significant. Third, we suggest a novel finding that conservative Protestants are no different than others in their attitudes toward Jews independent of race. As articulated above, religion has been a salient factor in historical work linking race and anti-Semitism (Dinnerstein 1994) . Our analysis of contemporary attitudes toward Jews, in contrast, finds that race is a more important characteristic and Christian conservatism has only a marginal effect above and beyond the effect of race.
General Out-Group Negativity or Jewish-Specific Attitudes?
A remaining question in light of our findings is whether racial minorities express similar feelings toward out-groups in general (Sniderman and Piazza 2002) . In other words, do our models capture sentiments that are specifically aimed at Jews? Or, do our analyses suggest a general negative disposition toward out-groups? We take two explicit steps toward addressing this question. First, if racial minorities are inclined to express concern about other groups in general, which includes but is not limited to Jews, then we might expect similar attitudes when asking about attitudes toward Christian conservatives, homosexuals, or recent immigrants in American society. If the results show that racial minorities are more apt to believe conservatives or gays have too much power in America, or express prejudice toward immigrants, we might qualify our claims concerning race and attitudes toward Jews. However, if race is unrelated or differently related to Jewish attitudes than views toward these other groups, that would be consistent with our argument concerning race-specific attitudes about Jews.
The regression tables for these analyses are presented in the Appendix (Tables A-1 and A-2). The results show no significant difference between whites and African Americans concerning perceptions of Christian conservative power, net of the control variables. Hispanics are less likely to see Christian conservatives as having too much power, whereas the coefficient was positive (but not significant) for Hispanic attitudes toward Jewish power (Table 5 ). Table A-1 also shows the coefficients for attitudes about the power of homosexuals. Using the same predictor variables, African Americans are less likely to perceive homosexuals as having too much power. We conduct yet a third test about attitudes toward recent immigrants. The AMS asked a random subsample of respondents to what extent they agreed that "new immigrants take away resources that should go to others, such as jobs and welfare?" 23 In this analysis, too, we find no significant correlation between race and attitudes toward recent immigrants. This is particularly interesting and important in light of the fact that African Americans and recent immigrants are usually more spatially contiguous with each other than with Jews. This suggests that Jews, who reside proximate to African Americans in some northern cities such as New York (Lee 2002) in either the same or adjacent neighborhoods (or operate as absentee landlords), hold a singular place in the views of some African Americans. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with the perspective that racial minorities have generally negative attitudes toward out-groups or other minorities, thus buttressing our argument that suggests a specific aversion toward Jews.
Second, the AMS included a battery of questions about different groups in American society and whether those groups agree with the respondent's vision of American society.
Among those referenced in this battery of questions were "Jews" and "whites," respectively. 24 We do not imply that this question indicates prejudice toward Jews, but it does show that respondents perceive Jews as different, at least on this criterion. Consistent with our account, we should expect a correlation between race and perceptions that Jews have a different vision of American society. Furthermore, we contend that this association should persist when statistically controlling for perceptions that whites have a different vision of American society. In other words, perceptions of Jews go beyond perceptions of whites. Our analysis is consistent with that premise (see Table A -2 in the Appendix). African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to believe that Jews have a different view of American society from their own. Importantly, these partial correlations remain positive and statistically significant when controlling for perceptions that whites hold a different view of American society, which is consistent with our argument that perceptions of Jews are not simply part of a general attitude toward whites.
Discussion
Previous scholarship has treated anti-Semitism as a unique form of prejudice requiring a distinct theoretical approach (Brustein 2003; Goldhagen 1996; Jaher 1994) . We depart from this line of thought, electing to view anti-Semitism partly through the lens of Blumer's (1958) theory of prejudice and contemporary interpretations of his seminal work. We identify two lineages extending from Blumer's thesis on prejudice and group position. The first, which we refer to as the group position model, emphasizes the importance of a group's social location in society and historical power differences between minority groups. According to this model, historically "alienated" races (Bobo and Hutchings 1996) in American society are more apt to perceive gains by other groups as threatening to their own success. Yet, we do not employ that framework uncritically, as the group position model does not easily reconcile the existence of prejudice among groups who are not in direct competition. We build on Blumer's ideas by illustrating the importance of linked histories, relative success, and resentment. Specifically, when decades of collaboration between groups are followed by unequal political and economic gains by the respective groups, then resentment can ensue. We suggest that such linked histories, particularly the post-civil rights era split between Jews and African Americans, partly accounts for differences between Hispanic and African American attitudes toward Jews. In addition, the relative success of Jews was not balanced by a net loss among Christian conservatives. The latter would find little utility in citing Jews as a threat since Christian conservatives remain a powerful group in American society.
Our data do not allow a direct test of African American collective memories and their association with anti-Semitism, and little data are available concerning African American anti-Jewish sentiment immediately following the civil rights movement. Future work might draw on interviews with Jews and African Americans, particularly former civil rights activists, to shed further light on this thesis. Still, our findings are consistent with such an explanation, and we offer it as a tenable and testable account that future work might further test with alternative methods and data.
A second perspective extending from Blumer's classic work also informs the present findings. Consonant with Blalock's (1967) and Quillian's (1995) research on minority group relations, the "collective threat" thesis draws attention to economic conditions and especially demographic composition. From this perspective, persons residing in geographic areas with large minority populations and in places with stagnating economic conditions are more prone to prejudice, particularly toward middle-man minorities such as Jews (Blalock 1967) . We find no convincing evidence that respondents residing in areas with lower employment rates 24. Respondents were read the following script: "Please tell me how much you think people in this group agree with YOUR vision of American society-almost completely, mostly, somewhat, or not at all?" (or higher unemployment rates) are on average more anti-Semitic, and only limited evidence that respondents in counties with larger Jewish populations are more likely to have negative beliefs about Jews. Jewish population size, however, is not altogether irrelevant for understanding anti-Jewish attitudes. Integrating the collective threat and group position models, we find that African Americans and Hispanics living in places with larger Jewish populations are more likely to exhibit anti-Jewish sentiments, particularly their abstract views toward Jewish power and loyalties. However, the correlation between Jewish population size and anti-Jewish sentiment is not significant for white respondents. Two reasons likely contribute to this conditional association. First, and as described earlier in this work, Jews have grown increasingly closer to other white Americans on many social indicators that include views on capital punishment, Israeli-Palestinian relations, and in some instances political ideology (Friedman 2003) . The numeric presence of Jews would thus have limited impact on perceptions of threat for whites. Second, and related to the previous point, Jewish separation from African Americans on many civil rights issues in recent decades, in combination with a proclivity for minority groups to view other minorities as competitive threats (Bobo and Hutchings 1996) , likely yielded resentment among African Americans that is fueled in the presence of large Jewish populations. We add that the interaction between race and Jewish population size is most pronounced for our question about Jewish power. That finding aligns with the collective threat perspective's tenet that groups vie for political advantages in society (Blalock 1967 ) and perceive political ascent by one group to come at the expense of another.
Our explanation of anti-Jewish sentiment in the United States provides a theoretical counterweight to largely religious interpretations. In that regard our results align with John Higham's (1955 Higham's ( , 1957 call for a more historical and contextual model of social anti-Semitism rather than religiously-based accounts. For each of our dependent variables in Tables 5  through 7 , an initial association was evident between conservative Protestants and the indicator of anti-Jewish sentiment. However, once race or the interaction between race and Jewish population size was statistically controlled, the direct association between Protestant conservatism and anti-Jewish attitudes decreased in magnitude and lost statistical significance. Thus, our results offer little support for the idea that Christian conservatism has sizeable predictive value in the study of contemporary anti-Jewish sentiments. This is a notable finding in light of prior work suggesting that the roots of anti-Semitism have largely religious foundations (Brustein 2003; Dinnerstein 1994 ; Goldhagan 1996 on Martin Luther and anti-Semitism). We do not deny the religious roots of Jewish aversion and prejudice, but we emphasize that this relationship is not static over time and space. At the same time, we stress that our conclusion concerning religious conservatism pertains largely to Christian denominations. Given that our sample included too few Muslims for valid comparisons, we cannot extend this conclusion beyond our data on Christian respondents. 25 A cursory look at anti-Semitism in the Arab world might question our findings, as countries with few Jewish residents harbor substantial anti-Semitism (e.g., Iran). We would predict, however, that anti-Semitism among Muslims in the United States would vary with the presence of Jews in their geographic area and the race and nativity of Muslim respondents. This remains an empirically testable question that could test the external validity of our findings.
Given the parallels between anti-Jewish sentiment and extant research on other forms of prejudice, our explanation of attitudes toward Jews provides a counterargument to scholarship suggesting that anti-Semitism has peculiar origins and that prejudice against Jews is conceptually unique from other forms of prejudice (Brustein 2003:44-45) . Our assessment favors a different position-that animosity toward Jews is akin to other forms of prejudice and that 25. Muslims constituted .3 percent of the total sample (before isolating non-Jewish respondents), which compares to the GSS (e.g., the 2000 GSS reported .3 percent of respondents were Muslim). While this speaks to the comparability of our sample to established surveys like the GSS, it does not allow for valid comparisons between Muslims and other groups.
anti-Semitism, like other forms of prejudice, is historically conditioned. We suggest future research on anti-Semitism and prejudice further engage this debate on the distinctiveness of anti-Jewish aversion and bigotry. Does anti-Jewish hostility hold a singular place among particular groups? Or is anti-Semitism part of a broader set of prejudicial attitudes directed toward out-groups generally? Comparisons of anti-Jewish prejudiced with hostility against other minority groups at both the macro and micro levels of analysis may shed light on the degree to which anti-Semitism constitutes a peculiar prejudice with unique antecedents. We cast some light on this issue to suggest that attitudes toward Jews are unique, yet future work might more explicitly investigate anti-Jewish attitudes as related to or distinct from anti-white attitudes. We present some evidence that attitudes toward Jews and whites are independent (see Table A -2 in the Appendix), yet that distinction warrants more empirical attention. Little work at present systematically compares prejudice toward Jews with other groups.
While our research advances a new perspective on anti-Jewish sentiments, we also acknowledge the limits of our study. For instance, much existing literature on anti-Semitism focuses on individual psychological factors that account for right-wing beliefs. Our focus was on the importance of group position and community demographics, and the data did not allow a simultaneous consideration of entirely psychological variables. Future research might investigate the effects of structural and psychological factors on anti-Semitism, particularly their interaction effects. We also suggest that future work integrate scholarship on collective memory and trauma (e.g., Alexander 2002) as informing the study of prejudice. Such a theoretical framework, we argue, would further inform the association between African Americans and Jews. In addition, our research might be replicated in different social contexts such as Europe, where anti-Semitic incidents have increased in recent years, especially in areas with growing immigrant populations. We suspect that in the European context, too, anti-Semitic attitudes would disproportionately exist among minority populations residing in or near Jewish enclaves. We maintain that this is an empirically testable hypothesis-one with increasing importance. 
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